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NEGLIGENCE - PROXIMA'rE CAUSE - LIABILITY OF SALOON KEEPER FOR
LIQUOR SALE AGAINST WIFB's NonCB-A wrongful death action was brought
by the widow and children of a deceased patron of defendant's saloon, the patron
having been fatally injured in a fall while engaged in fisticuffs after consuming
liquor sold by defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant knew that deceased
became belligerent when intoxicated and that sales were made despite widow's
prior request that liquor not be furnished to deceased husband in sufficient
quantity to cause intoxication. The trial court sustained a demurrer without
leave to amend and gave judgment for defendant. On appeal, held, reversed;
the trial court abused its discretion. Cole v. Rush, (Cal. 1954) 271 P. (2d) 47.
At common law it was not an actionable wrong to sell or furnish liquor to a
well and able-bodied man.1 To overcome this deficiency of the _common law,
the legislatures of a majority of the states have enacted Civil Damage or Dram
Shop Acts.2 These acts, depending on the nature of their provisions, grant a
cause of action against a vendor to those sustaining injury to their persons,
property, or means of support in consequence of intoxication resulting from
supplying liquor, and some states authorize recovery by the intoxicated person
as well.8 California has no such statute. This decision stands unique. At common law, vendors were absolved from liability for injuries to third persons
caused by an intoxicated vendee, on the ground that the drinking rather than
the sale of the liquor was the proximate cause of injury.4 In actions brought for
injury or death to the intoxicated person, the double barrier of lack of proximate
cause and contributory negligence of the drinker was raised.6 Even the negligence
per se rule arising from violation of a penal statute has been generally disregarded by the courts6 because of these defenses. Exceptions to the no liability
rule have been made, however, where the drinker was supplied after being
helplessly drunk.7 Further, the liquor supplier's general common law immunity
to civil liability was qualified prior to this decision by two classes of cases. The
first class stresses the duty of an innkeeper to provide for the safety of his guests
on the premises.8 The innkeeper is not held an insurer of his guests' safety, but
1 BLACK, INroxxcATING LIQUORS, c. 13, §281 (1892); 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors
§430, p. 716 (1947); 30 AM.. Jun., Intoxicating Liquors §607, p. 573 (1940).
2 See 3 VERNIER, AM.llmcAN FAMILY LAws 92 (1935), and supp. (1938) p. 87, where
33 jurisdictions are listed•.
8 30 AM.. Jun., Intoxicating Liquors §612, p. 576 (1940); BLACK, lNroXICATING
LIQUORS, c. 13 (1892).
4 Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939); Waller's Achnr. v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S.W. 766 (1911).
6 King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 60 Am. Rep. 119 (1886).
6 Fleclmer v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 246, 210 P. (2d) 530 (1949) (sale to
minor); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A. (2d) 754 (1951) (sale to minor); Hitson
v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 803, 143 P. (2d) 952 (1943) (sale to intoxicated person);
Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936).
7 McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168, 48 Am. Rep. 260 (1883); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Ore.
92, 35 P. (2d) 672 (1934).
s Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P. (2d) 675 (1936); Mastad v. Swedish Brethren,
83 Minn. 40, 85 N.W. 913 (1901); 106 A.L.R. 1003 (1937).
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rather must use due care to provide for their protection from known9 risks arising
from the use of alcohol.10 The principal case does not seem to fall into this class
since that duty was raised to protect one guest from injury by another, not to
protect an intoxicated guest from injuring himself.11 A second and more recent
extension of a liquor vendor's liability involves the continued sale of liquor to
a husband against repeated protests from the wife. This has given rise to a
cause of action in favor of the wife for the resultant loss of consortium.12 These
cases, in which the continued use of liquor has resulted in the drinker's loss of
volition, have been likened to the wrongful sale of drugs.13 The sale, merging
with the drinking, is held to become the proximate cause of the wife's injury.14
These cases involved an action for a breach of duty to the wife, and were not
based on a wrong to the husband.15 One case specifically pointed out that
recovery was allowed for loss of consortium before the husband died, and that
a wrongful death action could not have been supported since the deceased, had
he lived, could not have brought an action himself.16 Despite this lack of analogy
to the consortium cases, the majority in the principal case reasoned that the act
of selling liquor, "merging" with the drinking, was the proximate cause of injury.
The adoption of this doctrine, without an allegation that deceased's faculties had
been reduced to the point of lack of volition, disintegrates the core of the common law rule that the drinking and not the sale was the proximate cause of an
intoxicated person's injury. Therefore, since the defendant was alleged to have
known of deceased's tendency to be belligerent when drunk, the court could
hold the vendor negligent on the ground that individuals must be held to have
contemplated the natural and probable result of their own acts purposely and
intentionally committed. By fusing the elements of sale and drinking into one
link of the causal chain of injury, the traditional common law immunity of liquor
vendors seems to have been overcome in California. This rule could result in
liquor sellers being held to a standard of reasonable care as to whom and under
what conditions their sales are made. Adoption of this doctrine would permit
remedies unknown in states without Dram Shop Acts and would broaden recovery in states with limited civil damage laws. 17
Stephen C. Bransdorfer
Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, (D.C. Alaska 1950) 88 F. Supp. 900.
v, Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928).
.
v. Olson, 88 Minn. 307, 92 N.W. 1124 (1903); Rommel v. Schambacher,
120 Pa. 579, 11 A. 779 (1887).
12 Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P. (2d) 147 (1940); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161,
290 N.W. 482 (1940).
13 Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. (N.Y.) 202 (1867) (laudanum); Moberg v. Scott, 38 S.D.
422, 161 N.W. 998 (1917) (opium); Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N.E.
102 (1912) (morphine).
14 See 14 So. CAL. L. RBv. 91 (1940); 25 MINN. L. RBv. 113 (1940); 45 Dxcx. L.
RBv. 122 (1941); 2 WASH. & Lim L. RBv. 153 (1940).
1r; 59 A.L.R. 680 (1929); 130 A.L.R. 352 (1941).
16 Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161 at 164, 290 N.W. 482 (1940).
17 See 1941 Wis. L. RBv. 419, and 22 BoST. Umv. L. RBv. 480 (1942), dealing
respectively with lack of liability because of a limited damage act, and because of a repealed
damage act.
9

10 Gurren
11 Curran

